Fellow Limited Partners,
In the first quarter of 2026, the Select Credit Fund returned -0.8%.1
Since the strategy’s inception in May of 2020, the strategy has delivered a compound annual return of 8.7%, net of all fees.1
Performance
In one of the most geopolitically eventful quarters we’ve seen in decades, it was not a surprise to see uneven performance across sectors and asset classes. The dominant theme since 2022 - the AI wrecking ball - continued to smash its way through the market, colliding with its newest victim - the software sector. On the public side, many software stocks and credits, took a pronounced hit in Q1. On the private side, a crescendo of concern in the direct lending and syndicated loan market continued to build as record-high redemption requests were announced across an array of funds.
The Select Credit Fund’s strategy is to maximize risk adjusted returns through highly focused, opportunistic investments. Given the volatile and unevenly distribute market landscape, this is a season to be welcomed.
From large cap equities through to US treasuries, US markets found themselves down modestly at the quarter’s end. While the Fund was also down modestly in the quarter, this was a product of event-driven wins and portfolio-level hedges offsetting weakness in the technology sector.
On the plus side of the ledger, Ziff Davis announced a substantial divestiture at more than three times its own trading multiple, propelling our largest equity position 50% higher from the day before the news through quarter’s end.3 Our elaborated thoughts on this transaction can be found here. In addition to this, investment grade spread widening produced modest profits across our portfolio hedge in investment grade credit. In the quarter, private credit concerns called into question various exposures among insurance companies and US banks, benefitting our IG spread positioning, which has an emphasis on US banks.
On the other side of the ledger, our tech positions in Evolent Health 2029 convertible bonds (-18%) and Blackline equity (-33%) and Rapid7 2029 convertible bonds (-7.5%) detracted from performance on the back of AI-disruption concerns.4 Our response to each of these declines is worthy of note. In the case of Rapid7, we see the core products appear to be increasingly vulnerable to disruption and had been exiting prior to Anthropic’s Mythos release, which catalyzed our full exit of the position in early April. We view our principal mistake as it relates to Rapid7 was not in the issuer selection itself, but in our choice to swap from the company’s 2027 bonds which were almost completely backed by cash and cash flow through their maturity date, to their 2029 issue, which, in reality, offered insufficient additional M&A upside. In the case of Evolent Health, a weakening of the company’s financial performance caused outsized underperformance of their 2029 convertibles relative to the company’s equity, and we opted to hedge our position with the company’s equity as a means to lower our exposure to this credit. Finally, in the case of Blackline, an activist investor made meaningful strides March 10th, toward value-unlock at the company, underpinning our fundamental thesis of under-appreciated takeout optionality in this company’s debt and equity securities.5
While the technology sector has faced headwinds, we believe the resulting reset in valuations creates compelling opportunities, particularly in higher quality credits and select equities, where we continue to see solid fundamentals now at higher expected rates of return. As with any market washout (software included) there will be opportunities. To this end, Jensen Huang illuminated an insightful contrarian take on software in a recent podcast interview: that quality software can be thought of as tools for agents.6 We have already seen the beginning of this in the Microsoft suite. With a prompt or scheduled task, Claude Co-work can now autonomously perform work in applications such as Excel, Powerpoint and Word. As agents evolve and become better trained, this application set will broaden. By this logic, higher quality apps (tools) may see increasing demand, through agents, solidifying an application’s relevance for years to come.
Outlook
The geopolitical and market volatility of the first quarter of 2026 has reminded us of the importance of respecting uncertainty; that we need to acknowledge a broad range of future scenarios when we make an investment. This is why we orient our portfolio around the micro. By focusing on the micro - situation specific investments - we can expose ourselves to less hazards. And, if we’ve done the job right, the remaining ‘hazards’ we are exposed to are already heavily discounted into the price of the investment we’ve made.
Thank you for your partnership in the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP.
Footnotes:
1 Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP returns reflect Class P - Master Series, net of fees and expenses as of March 31, 2026.Inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020.
2 U.S. High Yield Bonds are represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged). See Additional Disclosures. All market-based data sourced from Bloomberg LP.
3 Source: Bloomberg
4 Source: Bloomberg
5 Company Press Release
6 Dwarkesh Podcast: Jensen Huang – Will Nvidia’s moat persist?
Performance is based on returns for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP. The inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020. As of May 1, 2025, returns are based on Class P, net of fees and expenses. Class P units bear management fees of 0.75% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From February 1, 2025 to April 30, 2025, the returns presented were those of Class S of the Fund, which bear management fees of 0.5% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From April 29, 2020 to January 31, 2025, returns are based on a separately managed account that shared a similar investment objective and strategy as the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP and were calculated net of fees and expenses matching those of Class P.
While the Fund’s overall investment objective remains the same, past performance is not indicative of future performance. Where the performance period is longer than 12 months, returns are annualized. The 2020 return represents performance from the inception of the Fund to December 31, 2020. Please note that firm AUM is an estimate until all NAVs are finalized. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding to the nearest percent.
The U.S. High Yield Bond Benchmark is represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged) (TSX: XHY). This benchmark has been selected for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP because it is a low-cost, index-tracking fund, representative of an individual’s opportunity cost in higher-yield fixed income, and is a widely known and followed fixed income benchmark. These benchmark indices are provided for informational purposes only, and comparisons to benchmarks and indices have limitations.
Investing in fixed income securities is the primary strategy of the Fund; however, the Fund does not invest in all, or necessarily any, of the securities that comprise the referenced benchmark indices. The Fund’s portfolio may contain, among other things, options, short positions, other securities, concentrated positions, and may employ leverage that is not reflected in these indices. As a result, no market index is directly comparable to the results of the Fund. Returns are unaudited.
This letter does not constitute an offer to sell units of any Ewing Morris Fund, collectively referred to as “Ewing Morris Funds.” Units of Ewing Morris Funds are only available to investors who meet applicable suitability and sophistication requirements.
Source for data referenced and benchmark information: Bloomberg and Ewing Morris. As of March 31, 2026.
Fellow Limited Partners,
In the first quarter of 2026, the Select Credit Fund returned -0.8%.1
Since the strategy’s inception in May of 2020, the strategy has delivered a compound annual return of 8.7%, net of all fees.1
Performance
In one of the most geopolitically eventful quarters we’ve seen in decades, it was not a surprise to see uneven performance across sectors and asset classes. The dominant theme since 2022 - the AI wrecking ball - continued to smash its way through the market, colliding with its newest victim - the software sector. On the public side, many software stocks and credits, took a pronounced hit in Q1. On the private side, a crescendo of concern in the direct lending and syndicated loan market continued to build as record-high redemption requests were announced across an array of funds.
The Select Credit Fund’s strategy is to maximize risk adjusted returns through highly focused, opportunistic investments. Given the volatile and unevenly distribute market landscape, this is a season to be welcomed.
From large cap equities through to US treasuries, US markets found themselves down modestly at the quarter’s end. While the Fund was also down modestly in the quarter, this was a product of event-driven wins and portfolio-level hedges offsetting weakness in the technology sector.
On the plus side of the ledger, Ziff Davis announced a substantial divestiture at more than three times its own trading multiple, propelling our largest equity position 50% higher from the day before the news through quarter’s end.3 Our elaborated thoughts on this transaction can be found here. In addition to this, investment grade spread widening produced modest profits across our portfolio hedge in investment grade credit. In the quarter, private credit concerns called into question various exposures among insurance companies and US banks, benefitting our IG spread positioning, which has an emphasis on US banks.
On the other side of the ledger, our tech positions in Evolent Health 2029 convertible bonds (-18%) and Blackline equity (-33%) and Rapid7 2029 convertible bonds (-7.5%) detracted from performance on the back of AI-disruption concerns.4 Our response to each of these declines is worthy of note. In the case of Rapid7, we see the core products appear to be increasingly vulnerable to disruption and had been exiting prior to Anthropic’s Mythos release, which catalyzed our full exit of the position in early April. We view our principal mistake as it relates to Rapid7 was not in the issuer selection itself, but in our choice to swap from the company’s 2027 bonds which were almost completely backed by cash and cash flow through their maturity date, to their 2029 issue, which, in reality, offered insufficient additional M&A upside. In the case of Evolent Health, a weakening of the company’s financial performance caused outsized underperformance of their 2029 convertibles relative to the company’s equity, and we opted to hedge our position with the company’s equity as a means to lower our exposure to this credit. Finally, in the case of Blackline, an activist investor made meaningful strides March 10th, toward value-unlock at the company, underpinning our fundamental thesis of under-appreciated takeout optionality in this company’s debt and equity securities.5
While the technology sector has faced headwinds, we believe the resulting reset in valuations creates compelling opportunities, particularly in higher quality credits and select equities, where we continue to see solid fundamentals now at higher expected rates of return. As with any market washout (software included) there will be opportunities. To this end, Jensen Huang illuminated an insightful contrarian take on software in a recent podcast interview: that quality software can be thought of as tools for agents.6 We have already seen the beginning of this in the Microsoft suite. With a prompt or scheduled task, Claude Co-work can now autonomously perform work in applications such as Excel, Powerpoint and Word. As agents evolve and become better trained, this application set will broaden. By this logic, higher quality apps (tools) may see increasing demand, through agents, solidifying an application’s relevance for years to come.
Outlook
The geopolitical and market volatility of the first quarter of 2026 has reminded us of the importance of respecting uncertainty; that we need to acknowledge a broad range of future scenarios when we make an investment. This is why we orient our portfolio around the micro. By focusing on the micro - situation specific investments - we can expose ourselves to less hazards. And, if we’ve done the job right, the remaining ‘hazards’ we are exposed to are already heavily discounted into the price of the investment we’ve made.
Thank you for your partnership in the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP.
Footnotes:
1 Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP returns reflect Class P - Master Series, net of fees and expenses as of March 31, 2026.Inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020.
2 U.S. High Yield Bonds are represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged). See Additional Disclosures. All market-based data sourced from Bloomberg LP.
3 Source: Bloomberg
4 Source: Bloomberg
5 Company Press Release
6 Dwarkesh Podcast: Jensen Huang – Will Nvidia’s moat persist?
Performance is based on returns for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP. The inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020. As of May 1, 2025, returns are based on Class P, net of fees and expenses. Class P units bear management fees of 0.75% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From February 1, 2025 to April 30, 2025, the returns presented were those of Class S of the Fund, which bear management fees of 0.5% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From April 29, 2020 to January 31, 2025, returns are based on a separately managed account that shared a similar investment objective and strategy as the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP and were calculated net of fees and expenses matching those of Class P.
While the Fund’s overall investment objective remains the same, past performance is not indicative of future performance. Where the performance period is longer than 12 months, returns are annualized. The 2020 return represents performance from the inception of the Fund to December 31, 2020. Please note that firm AUM is an estimate until all NAVs are finalized. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding to the nearest percent.
The U.S. High Yield Bond Benchmark is represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged) (TSX: XHY). This benchmark has been selected for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP because it is a low-cost, index-tracking fund, representative of an individual’s opportunity cost in higher-yield fixed income, and is a widely known and followed fixed income benchmark. These benchmark indices are provided for informational purposes only, and comparisons to benchmarks and indices have limitations.
Investing in fixed income securities is the primary strategy of the Fund; however, the Fund does not invest in all, or necessarily any, of the securities that comprise the referenced benchmark indices. The Fund’s portfolio may contain, among other things, options, short positions, other securities, concentrated positions, and may employ leverage that is not reflected in these indices. As a result, no market index is directly comparable to the results of the Fund. Returns are unaudited.
This letter does not constitute an offer to sell units of any Ewing Morris Fund, collectively referred to as “Ewing Morris Funds.” Units of Ewing Morris Funds are only available to investors who meet applicable suitability and sophistication requirements.
Source for data referenced and benchmark information: Bloomberg and Ewing Morris. As of March 31, 2026.
Fellow Limited Partners,
In the first quarter of 2026, the Select Credit Fund returned -0.8%.1
Since the strategy’s inception in May of 2020, the strategy has delivered a compound annual return of 8.7%, net of all fees.1
Performance
In one of the most geopolitically eventful quarters we’ve seen in decades, it was not a surprise to see uneven performance across sectors and asset classes. The dominant theme since 2022 - the AI wrecking ball - continued to smash its way through the market, colliding with its newest victim - the software sector. On the public side, many software stocks and credits, took a pronounced hit in Q1. On the private side, a crescendo of concern in the direct lending and syndicated loan market continued to build as record-high redemption requests were announced across an array of funds.
The Select Credit Fund’s strategy is to maximize risk adjusted returns through highly focused, opportunistic investments. Given the volatile and unevenly distribute market landscape, this is a season to be welcomed.
From large cap equities through to US treasuries, US markets found themselves down modestly at the quarter’s end. While the Fund was also down modestly in the quarter, this was a product of event-driven wins and portfolio-level hedges offsetting weakness in the technology sector.
On the plus side of the ledger, Ziff Davis announced a substantial divestiture at more than three times its own trading multiple, propelling our largest equity position 50% higher from the day before the news through quarter’s end.3 Our elaborated thoughts on this transaction can be found here. In addition to this, investment grade spread widening produced modest profits across our portfolio hedge in investment grade credit. In the quarter, private credit concerns called into question various exposures among insurance companies and US banks, benefitting our IG spread positioning, which has an emphasis on US banks.
On the other side of the ledger, our tech positions in Evolent Health 2029 convertible bonds (-18%) and Blackline equity (-33%) and Rapid7 2029 convertible bonds (-7.5%) detracted from performance on the back of AI-disruption concerns.4 Our response to each of these declines is worthy of note. In the case of Rapid7, we see the core products appear to be increasingly vulnerable to disruption and had been exiting prior to Anthropic’s Mythos release, which catalyzed our full exit of the position in early April. We view our principal mistake as it relates to Rapid7 was not in the issuer selection itself, but in our choice to swap from the company’s 2027 bonds which were almost completely backed by cash and cash flow through their maturity date, to their 2029 issue, which, in reality, offered insufficient additional M&A upside. In the case of Evolent Health, a weakening of the company’s financial performance caused outsized underperformance of their 2029 convertibles relative to the company’s equity, and we opted to hedge our position with the company’s equity as a means to lower our exposure to this credit. Finally, in the case of Blackline, an activist investor made meaningful strides March 10th, toward value-unlock at the company, underpinning our fundamental thesis of under-appreciated takeout optionality in this company’s debt and equity securities.5
While the technology sector has faced headwinds, we believe the resulting reset in valuations creates compelling opportunities, particularly in higher quality credits and select equities, where we continue to see solid fundamentals now at higher expected rates of return. As with any market washout (software included) there will be opportunities. To this end, Jensen Huang illuminated an insightful contrarian take on software in a recent podcast interview: that quality software can be thought of as tools for agents.6 We have already seen the beginning of this in the Microsoft suite. With a prompt or scheduled task, Claude Co-work can now autonomously perform work in applications such as Excel, Powerpoint and Word. As agents evolve and become better trained, this application set will broaden. By this logic, higher quality apps (tools) may see increasing demand, through agents, solidifying an application’s relevance for years to come.
Outlook
The geopolitical and market volatility of the first quarter of 2026 has reminded us of the importance of respecting uncertainty; that we need to acknowledge a broad range of future scenarios when we make an investment. This is why we orient our portfolio around the micro. By focusing on the micro - situation specific investments - we can expose ourselves to less hazards. And, if we’ve done the job right, the remaining ‘hazards’ we are exposed to are already heavily discounted into the price of the investment we’ve made.
Thank you for your partnership in the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP.
Footnotes:
1 Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP returns reflect Class P - Master Series, net of fees and expenses as of March 31, 2026.Inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020.
2 U.S. High Yield Bonds are represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged). See Additional Disclosures. All market-based data sourced from Bloomberg LP.
3 Source: Bloomberg
4 Source: Bloomberg
5 Company Press Release
6 Dwarkesh Podcast: Jensen Huang – Will Nvidia’s moat persist?
Performance is based on returns for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP. The inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020. As of May 1, 2025, returns are based on Class P, net of fees and expenses. Class P units bear management fees of 0.75% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From February 1, 2025 to April 30, 2025, the returns presented were those of Class S of the Fund, which bear management fees of 0.5% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From April 29, 2020 to January 31, 2025, returns are based on a separately managed account that shared a similar investment objective and strategy as the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP and were calculated net of fees and expenses matching those of Class P.
While the Fund’s overall investment objective remains the same, past performance is not indicative of future performance. Where the performance period is longer than 12 months, returns are annualized. The 2020 return represents performance from the inception of the Fund to December 31, 2020. Please note that firm AUM is an estimate until all NAVs are finalized. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding to the nearest percent.
The U.S. High Yield Bond Benchmark is represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged) (TSX: XHY). This benchmark has been selected for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP because it is a low-cost, index-tracking fund, representative of an individual’s opportunity cost in higher-yield fixed income, and is a widely known and followed fixed income benchmark. These benchmark indices are provided for informational purposes only, and comparisons to benchmarks and indices have limitations.
Investing in fixed income securities is the primary strategy of the Fund; however, the Fund does not invest in all, or necessarily any, of the securities that comprise the referenced benchmark indices. The Fund’s portfolio may contain, among other things, options, short positions, other securities, concentrated positions, and may employ leverage that is not reflected in these indices. As a result, no market index is directly comparable to the results of the Fund. Returns are unaudited.
This letter does not constitute an offer to sell units of any Ewing Morris Fund, collectively referred to as “Ewing Morris Funds.” Units of Ewing Morris Funds are only available to investors who meet applicable suitability and sophistication requirements.
Source for data referenced and benchmark information: Bloomberg and Ewing Morris. As of March 31, 2026.
Fellow Limited Partners,
In the first quarter of 2026, the Select Credit Fund returned -0.8%.1
Since the strategy’s inception in May of 2020, the strategy has delivered a compound annual return of 8.7%, net of all fees.1
Performance
In one of the most geopolitically eventful quarters we’ve seen in decades, it was not a surprise to see uneven performance across sectors and asset classes. The dominant theme since 2022 - the AI wrecking ball - continued to smash its way through the market, colliding with its newest victim - the software sector. On the public side, many software stocks and credits, took a pronounced hit in Q1. On the private side, a crescendo of concern in the direct lending and syndicated loan market continued to build as record-high redemption requests were announced across an array of funds.
The Select Credit Fund’s strategy is to maximize risk adjusted returns through highly focused, opportunistic investments. Given the volatile and unevenly distribute market landscape, this is a season to be welcomed.
From large cap equities through to US treasuries, US markets found themselves down modestly at the quarter’s end. While the Fund was also down modestly in the quarter, this was a product of event-driven wins and portfolio-level hedges offsetting weakness in the technology sector.
On the plus side of the ledger, Ziff Davis announced a substantial divestiture at more than three times its own trading multiple, propelling our largest equity position 50% higher from the day before the news through quarter’s end.3 Our elaborated thoughts on this transaction can be found here. In addition to this, investment grade spread widening produced modest profits across our portfolio hedge in investment grade credit. In the quarter, private credit concerns called into question various exposures among insurance companies and US banks, benefitting our IG spread positioning, which has an emphasis on US banks.
On the other side of the ledger, our tech positions in Evolent Health 2029 convertible bonds (-18%) and Blackline equity (-33%) and Rapid7 2029 convertible bonds (-7.5%) detracted from performance on the back of AI-disruption concerns.4 Our response to each of these declines is worthy of note. In the case of Rapid7, we see the core products appear to be increasingly vulnerable to disruption and had been exiting prior to Anthropic’s Mythos release, which catalyzed our full exit of the position in early April. We view our principal mistake as it relates to Rapid7 was not in the issuer selection itself, but in our choice to swap from the company’s 2027 bonds which were almost completely backed by cash and cash flow through their maturity date, to their 2029 issue, which, in reality, offered insufficient additional M&A upside. In the case of Evolent Health, a weakening of the company’s financial performance caused outsized underperformance of their 2029 convertibles relative to the company’s equity, and we opted to hedge our position with the company’s equity as a means to lower our exposure to this credit. Finally, in the case of Blackline, an activist investor made meaningful strides March 10th, toward value-unlock at the company, underpinning our fundamental thesis of under-appreciated takeout optionality in this company’s debt and equity securities.5
While the technology sector has faced headwinds, we believe the resulting reset in valuations creates compelling opportunities, particularly in higher quality credits and select equities, where we continue to see solid fundamentals now at higher expected rates of return. As with any market washout (software included) there will be opportunities. To this end, Jensen Huang illuminated an insightful contrarian take on software in a recent podcast interview: that quality software can be thought of as tools for agents.6 We have already seen the beginning of this in the Microsoft suite. With a prompt or scheduled task, Claude Co-work can now autonomously perform work in applications such as Excel, Powerpoint and Word. As agents evolve and become better trained, this application set will broaden. By this logic, higher quality apps (tools) may see increasing demand, through agents, solidifying an application’s relevance for years to come.
Outlook
The geopolitical and market volatility of the first quarter of 2026 has reminded us of the importance of respecting uncertainty; that we need to acknowledge a broad range of future scenarios when we make an investment. This is why we orient our portfolio around the micro. By focusing on the micro - situation specific investments - we can expose ourselves to less hazards. And, if we’ve done the job right, the remaining ‘hazards’ we are exposed to are already heavily discounted into the price of the investment we’ve made.
Thank you for your partnership in the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP.
Footnotes:
1 Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP returns reflect Class P - Master Series, net of fees and expenses as of March 31, 2026.Inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020.
2 U.S. High Yield Bonds are represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged). See Additional Disclosures. All market-based data sourced from Bloomberg LP.
3 Source: Bloomberg
4 Source: Bloomberg
5 Company Press Release
6 Dwarkesh Podcast: Jensen Huang – Will Nvidia’s moat persist?
Performance is based on returns for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP. The inception date of the strategy is April 29, 2020. As of May 1, 2025, returns are based on Class P, net of fees and expenses. Class P units bear management fees of 0.75% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From February 1, 2025 to April 30, 2025, the returns presented were those of Class S of the Fund, which bear management fees of 0.5% per annum, as well as performance fees, as applicable. From April 29, 2020 to January 31, 2025, returns are based on a separately managed account that shared a similar investment objective and strategy as the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP and were calculated net of fees and expenses matching those of Class P.
While the Fund’s overall investment objective remains the same, past performance is not indicative of future performance. Where the performance period is longer than 12 months, returns are annualized. The 2020 return represents performance from the inception of the Fund to December 31, 2020. Please note that firm AUM is an estimate until all NAVs are finalized. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding to the nearest percent.
The U.S. High Yield Bond Benchmark is represented by the iShares U.S. High Yield Bond Index ETF (CAD-Hedged) (TSX: XHY). This benchmark has been selected for the Ewing Morris Select Credit Fund LP because it is a low-cost, index-tracking fund, representative of an individual’s opportunity cost in higher-yield fixed income, and is a widely known and followed fixed income benchmark. These benchmark indices are provided for informational purposes only, and comparisons to benchmarks and indices have limitations.
Investing in fixed income securities is the primary strategy of the Fund; however, the Fund does not invest in all, or necessarily any, of the securities that comprise the referenced benchmark indices. The Fund’s portfolio may contain, among other things, options, short positions, other securities, concentrated positions, and may employ leverage that is not reflected in these indices. As a result, no market index is directly comparable to the results of the Fund. Returns are unaudited.
This letter does not constitute an offer to sell units of any Ewing Morris Fund, collectively referred to as “Ewing Morris Funds.” Units of Ewing Morris Funds are only available to investors who meet applicable suitability and sophistication requirements.
Source for data referenced and benchmark information: Bloomberg and Ewing Morris. As of March 31, 2026.
Minimizing Tax Drag (Part 1)
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Minimizing Tax Drag (Part 2)
